This paper seeks to explain when and why states engage in civilian nuclear cooperation.
INTRODUCTION

On July 18, 2005 U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh reached a historic agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. 1 The terms of the deal permit the sale of nuclear fuel and reactor components to India, reversing a moratorium on such trade. 2 The agreement has met staunch criticism because it threatens to undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime. India is not a signatory to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and possesses nuclear weapons, which call its nonproliferation record into question. Further, India's status outside the NPT undermines salient in explaining civilian nuclear commerce than variables rooted in nonproliferation, such as whether the importing state is pursuing nuclear weapons or has signed the NPT. I test these hypotheses using a new dataset I created based on the coding of more than 2,000 civilian bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs), which authorize particular nuclear transactions. The empirical analyses lend robust support to my hypotheses.
These results have a number of theoretical and policy-relevant implications. My study adds to scholarly understanding of when states transfer technology and knowledge that could be used to build nuclear weapons (e.g. Kroenig 2007; Fuhrmann 2008) . In doing so, it contributes to our understanding of how nuclear weapons spread. This is especially important in light of recent evidence suggesting that nuclear weapons have security implications beyond those that have been well known to scholars and practitioners for decades (Asal and Beardsley this issue; Gartzke and Jo this issue;
Horowitz this issue; Rachhaus this issue).
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My finding that supplier states' strategic interests are more important than limiting the spread of nuclear weapons is troubling from a nonproliferation standpoint.
While an NPT commitment reduces the probability a state will pursue nuclear weapons (Jo and Gartzke 2007) , it does not make it any more likely to receive nuclear technology even though all treaty members are entitled to nuclear technology for "peaceful purposes." 8 While states with high energy needs may be more likely to sign the NPT (Way and Sasikumar 2007) , my results indicate that the promise of nuclear energy assistance often goes unfulfilled. Ultimately, this casts some doubt on the effectiveness of the NPT.
This paper proceeds by developing hypotheses relating to trade in civilian nuclear technology. Next, it describes the empirical approach to testing these hypotheses and discusses the results. It concludes by summarizing the results and highlighting the contributions of this study.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
There has been some important scholarly work on nuclear trade. Much of this literature considers the controls governments have in place to restrict nuclear trade, rather than the actual exchange of such commodities (e.g. Bertsch, Cupitt, and Elliott-Gower 1994) . A few studies analyze trade in nuclear-related items. Much of this effort involves case studies that seek to explain the nuclear exports of a single country (Lowrance 1976; Boardman and Keeley 1983; Potter 1990; Paul 2003; Corera 2006; Bratt 2006) . Kroenig My study compliments Kroenig's (2007) work by considering all civilian nuclear trade, rather than just the most sensitive transfers.
This study offers the first generalizable and comprehensive theory of why states engage in civilian nuclear cooperation. 10 The argument I advance is based on two assumptions. The first is that nuclear trade directly and indirectly bolsters the capabilities of the importing state. For example, importing a nuclear power reactor improves a state's energy production capacity, which has a direct effect on its capabilities since energy production is an important element of national power (e.g. Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) . Importing a power reactor also indirectly enhances the state's capabilities since enhanced energy production capacity frees up resources that can be used to bolster its military capabilities. Second, since all nuclear commodities are dual-use in nature, importing states can use the technology and knowledge they acquire to build nuclear weapons. Many states acquire nuclear technology for "peaceful purposes" and later employ it in military applications (Bunn 2001) . Further, nuclear commodities supplied to one state could be diverted or re-exported to a third party, as the A.Q. Khan network illustrates (Corera 2006) . 11 The third party can use these commodities and knowledge to pursue nuclear weapons.
With these assumptions in mind, my theoretical argument is that supplier states export civilian nuclear technology to meet security-related objectives and that these considerations are more salient than normative concerns limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. A number of hypotheses flow from this general argument. What follows is a discussion of these hypotheses.
Hypotheses
A number of studies have found that military allies trade more than non-allies (Gowa 1994; Mansfield and Bronson 1997; Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998; Long 2003; Long and Leeds 2006) . While enemies may fear what one another will do with the gains from trade, allies are less concerned with this because they typically pursue similar ends. Based on related logic, I expect that supplier states are more likely to supply nuclear technology to their allies. Civilian nuclear trade among allies strengthens the overall alliance by augmenting the capabilities of the importing state and improving intraalliance relations (Skålnes 2000) . This benefits supplier states because it puts them in a better position to meet strategic objectives, such as deterring third party aggression (Farber and Gowa 1995 ).
An alliance also minimizes the potential that proliferation-related consequences will arise from nuclear trade. Although it is debatable whether a state ever wants its ally to acquire nuclear weapons, it is likely to feel comparatively less threatened by an ally's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Equally important, allies are more likely to protect the nuclear technology they import than are adversaries. In other words, allies are less likely to re-export sensitive technology if such a transfer is not authorized by the initial suppler.
Such behavior could threaten the security of the supplier state and if repeated, result in the collapse of the alliance. Since states depend on an alliance to enhance their security, they are unlikely to intentionally jeopardize its existence. Thus, allies can exchange nuclear technology with a degree confidence. Pakistan can be explained by a desire to "limit India's power capabilities to South Asia and thereby constrain New Delhi's aspirations to become a major power in Asia" (Paul 2003) . From Beijing's perspective, if India is worried about a nuclear arms race with
Pakistan it would be less concerned with its rivalry with China. This logic suggests that civilian nuclear trade can be conceived as an instrument of "soft balancing," which is involves "tacit cooperation short of formal alliances" designed to constrain the power of potentially threatening states (Paul, Wirtz and Fortmann 2004: 3) .
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In addition to allowing the supplier to constrain its adversary, exporting technology to an enemy of a threatening state provides at least temporary assurances that nuclear items will not be used to construct nuclear weapons. Having shared strategic interests reduces the likelihood that states' cooperation will be exploited (Walt 1987 In international politics, states are most threatened by the strongest countries in the international system (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer 1994/95 12 Civilian nuclear trade between adversaries imposes severe negative consequences on exporting states. It increases the likelihood that imported technology will be used to construct nuclear weapons since enemies are highly sensitive to relative gains and look for ways to bolster their capabilities (Paul 2000; Grieco 1988; Waltz 1979 ). This increases the likelihood that the gains from trade the importing state experiences will undermine the security of the exporting state. Further, supplier states have incentives to restrict nuclear trade with adversaries in order to make discrimination in favor of allies more meaningful (Skålnes 2000) .
Hypothesis 4: Suppliers export less nuclear technology to states they are engaged in militarized conflict with.
Regime type, particularly the institutional features of democracy, also affects civilian nuclear cooperation. Previous research notes that democratic institutions are amenable to cooperation because they promote transparency (Fearon 1994; Gaubatz 1996) . Fearon (1994) , for example, argues that the open information channels in democracies make it easier to signal intentions and make credible commitments. The propensity of democracies to make more credible commitments ensures nuclear suppliers that their exports are less likely to be used for unauthorized purposes. Further assurances stem from the free-flow of information in democracies, which makes it more difficult for the importing state to employ technology in pursuit of nuclear weapons or divert it to a third party without the exporting state finding out. To avoid the consequences that are likely to ensue following these actions, democratic importers are unlikely to do either. In these respects, democracy reduces the likelihood that nuclear trade will undermine the supplier state's security. 13 Hypothesis 5: Supplier states are more likely to export nuclear technology to democratic states than non-democratic states.
METHODOLOGY
Data
I adopt a time-series cross-sectional data structure for the period 1950 to 2000.
The unit of analysis is the directed dyad year. Included in the dataset are all major nuclear suppliers and all potential recipient dyads in the international system. Major suppliers include the "traditional exporters" and the "emerging suppliers" as defined by Potter (1990) . 14 All major suppliers are included in the dataset beginning in the first year subsequent to 1950 that they acquire a nuclear engineering or uranium production capability. To determine when this occurred, I consult data on nuclear production capabilities compiled by Jo and Gartzke (2007) . Table I provides a list of the major nuclear suppliers including the first year subsequent to 1950 that they acquired this capability. All states in the system are potential recipients of nuclear-related commodities.
(Insert Table I about here)
Dependent Variable and Measurement
To determine whether states are trading nuclear commodities, I consult a list of bilateral NCAs compiled by James Keeley (2003) . NCAs are bilateral treaties signed by states that authorize the exchange of nuclear goods and services. They are an appropriate dependent variable because they represent the mechanism by which supplier states channel nuclear trade towards some states and away from others. Keeley (2003) includes NCAs in his list based on a few key criteria. Above all, the agreement must deal with nuclear power and related issues. He includes agreements that call for: (1) the exchange of goods and knowledge related to nuclear power; (2) the exploration of uranium; or (3) assistance in the areas of nuclear safety, safeguards, and waste management. Excluded are: (1) agreements that are explicitly defense-related; (2) financial agreements, (3) agreements dealing solely with agricultural or industrial agreements not related to nuclear power; (4) agreements dealing with the leasing of nuclear material; (5) liability agreements; and (6) multilateral agreements. 15 Since 1950, more than 2,000 agreements meet these criteria (Keeley 2003).
Among those NCAs that involve the exchange of nuclear commodities, it is not always clear who the supplier is based on the information included in the treaty text.
Making a determination on this point is important. To do so, I adopt the following coding rules. In cases of specific supply arrangements (e.g. an NCA signed to authorize the construction of a particular nuclear facility) it is easy to identify the supplier and what is being exchanged based on the treaty's title or text. For other NCAs, identifying suppliers is a bit more difficult because of the language used in these agreements. States party to an NCA that have supply potential (according to the criteria established above) at the time the agreement was signed are assumed to supply nuclear goods while states that lack either capability at the time the agreement was signed are considered to be only recipients of such commodities. 16 Based on these criteria, I construct a dichotomous dependent variable and code it annually. This variable measures whether a state signed a NCA that involves the supply of nuclear items in a given year.
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Independent Variables and Measurement
A number of independent variables are employed to operationalize the hypotheses described above. Shared enemies, superpower enemies, military alliances, and democracy all increase the likelihood of nuclear cooperation while militarized conflict reduces it. Data on shared enemies and superpower enemies were self-coded from the New Rivalry Dataset compiled by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) . 
Control Variables and Measurement
A number of economic variables could influence the supply and demand for civilian nuclear commodities. It remains widely accepted that a state's capacity to supply exports as well as a state's demand for imports is directly related to its GDP (Anderson 1979) . I include variables measuring the GDP of the exporting state and the GDP of the importing state in year t-1. 21 The distance between countries controls for the transportation and transaction costs associated with trade. These costs are expected to rise as the distance between two countries increases. I include a variable measuring the "great circle" distance between the capitals of states. 22 The nuclear-related resources of the supplier and recipient states may also affect the supply and demand for civilian nuclear commodities. I include variables measuring the supplier and importing states' nuclear resources in year t-1 using Jo and Gartzke's (2007) nuclear production data. 23 To control for the importing state's energy demand, I include a variable measuring the ratio of the country's energy production capacity to its population. These data are obtained from the COW's National Military Capabilities dataset (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) . Finally, the price of oil might affect a state's demand for nuclear energy. To control for this, I include a variable measuring the price of a barrel of oil measured in U.S. dollars in year t-1. 24 Factors related to nuclear nonproliferation might also affect civilian nuclear cooperation. States that are at least exploring nuclear weapons might be less likely to be on the receiving end of a nuclear cooperation agreement since supplier states generally do not want their exports to contribute to proliferation. I create a dichotomous variable and code it 1 if the recipient state is at least "exploring" nuclear weapons in year t-1 based on 
Method of Analysis
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use logistic regression analysis (logit) to estimate the effect that these independent variables have on the probability of nuclear-related trade. All independent variables are lagged one year to control for endogeneity. I employ clustering across dyads to control for heteroskedastic error variance and use white robust estimation to correct the standard errors for spatial dependence. Additionally, I introduce a variable measuring the number of years since 1950 that lapse without a dyad signing a NCA and three cubic splines to control for autocorrelation in the dependent variable (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) . Table II contains the initial results. Column I displays a model that includes only the variables operationalizing the supplier state's security interests while Column II displays the fully specified model that includes control variables for supply and demand, the importing state's security environment, and nuclear nonproliferation. Column III presents the results of a trimmed model with the variables that were statistically insignificant in Column II removed. As Table II reveals, the results are consistent across model specifications.
RESULTS
(Insert Table II about here)
Some interesting results emerge from this analysis. As Table II indicates, a military alliance has a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of a dyad signing a NCA in a particular year. Substantively, a military alliance increases the probability that a dyad will sign a NCA in a particular year by .0033, from .0034 to .0067. As Table III indicates, in an average year, we can expect around 9 non-allies and 19 allies to sign nuclear cooperation agreements. Thus, allies are more than twice as likely to engage in civilian nuclear commerce. Of the explanatory variables, only militarized conflict has a stronger substantive effect on the probability of nuclear cooperation. This result lends further empirical support to the notion that alliances affect foreign economic cooperation (Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Gowa 1994; Long 2003) and my argument that supplier states export nuclear technology to their allies to strengthen the overall alliance.
The coefficient on the variable measuring whether the supplier and importer share a common enemy is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that states are statistically more likely to engage in nuclear cooperation with those that they share enemies with. Substantively, the results suggest that having a common enemy increases the probability that states in a dyad will sign a NCA by .0007, from .0035 to .0042. In an average year, states that share enemies will sign roughly 12 NCAs while states that do not share enemies will sign only 10 NCAs. These results provide substantive and statistically significant support to my argument that states use civilian nuclear cooperation as a means to constrain the capabilities of their enemies, although the substantive effect produced by the shared enemy variable is the most modest of the explanatory variables.
(Insert Table III about here)
A related hypothesis is that states are likely to provide civilian nuclear assistance to those that are enemies of superpowers. The coefficient on the variable measuring whether the importing state is a superpower enemy is positive and statistically significant, indicating that suppliers are more likely to supply nuclear technology to those that are enemies of the most powerful states in the system. Being a superpower enemy also has a substantively significant effect on nuclear cooperation; it increases the probability that a supplier state will provide nuclear technology by .0018, from .0034 to .0052. In an average year, suppliers will sign roughly 14 NCAs with superpower enemies and 9 NCAs with states that are not superpower enemies. Collectively, these first two results lend support to my argument that civilian nuclear cooperation is a form of "soft balancing"
(e.g. Paul 2005 ) that suppliers employ to counter the influence of threatening states.
I find that the regime type of the importing state affects nuclear cooperation. 26 The coefficient on the variable measuring whether the importing state is a democracy is positive and statistically significant. Being a democracy increases the probability that a state will be on the receiving end of a NCA by .0009, from .0033 to .0042. In an average year, we can expect that non-democratic states will be on the receiving end of roughly 9
NCAs while democratic states are on the receiving end of roughly 12. This lends support to my argument that the transparency stemming from democratic institutions (e.g.
Gaubatz 1996) decreases the likelihood that civilian nuclear exports will contribute to proliferation.
The coefficient on the variable measuring whether the exporting and importing states are involved in militarized conflict is negative and statistically significant, as expected. 27 Militarized conflict reduces the probability that states will sign a NCA by .0023, from .0036 to .0013. In an average year, states engaged in militarized conflict are expected to sign roughly 4 NCAs while states not engaged in conflict are expected to sign roughly 10 NCAs. Thus, states are nearly three times less likely to engage in nuclear cooperation when they are involved in militarized conflict. This is the strongest substantive effect produced by any of the explanatory variables. These findings lend support to my argument that states avoid trading with their enemies because doing so harms their security interests.
The variables controlling for supply and demand behave largely as expected. 28 The supplying and importing states' GDP and nuclear-related resources have positive and statistically significant effects on the probability of civilian nuclear trade. The coefficient on the variable measuring the distance between the supplier and importer has a statistically significant and negative effect, as expected. The coefficients on the variables measuring the energy demand of the importing state and the price of oil are statistically insignificant, contrary to expectations. Of all the variables, the importing state's nuclear capability has the largest substantive effect on the probability of nuclear cooperation.
Increasing the value of the importer's nuclear capability variable from ½ standard deviation above its mean to ½ standard deviation below its mean increases the probability of nuclear cooperation by .0039, from .0009 to .0048. This is, however, the only economic variable that has a stronger substantive effect than the security-related variables.
Turning to the controls dealing with the importer's security environment, whether another state in the region receives nuclear technology has a positive and statistically significant effect on nuclear cooperation. This suggests that states are sensitive to relative gains concerns (e.g. Waltz 1979) and are more likely to seek civilian nuclear assistance when their neighbors do so. Contrary to expectations, the results reveal that states involved in a rivalry are less likely to receive nuclear assistance.
The most interesting results deal with the nonproliferation-related controls. The coefficient on the variable measuring whether the importing state is pursuing nuclear weapons is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that states with weapons programs are more likely to be on the receiving end of nuclear cooperation agreements.
This finding contradicts the conventional wisdom that supplier states refrain from providing nuclear technology to those that are pursuing nuclear weapons because they do not want to contribute to proliferation. NSG membership has a positive and significant effect on the probability of nuclear cooperation but NPT membership has a negative effect on this probability, contrary to expectations. 29 The nuclear weapons pursuit and NPT membership findings have important theoretical and practical implications, which I will further discuss below.
Temporal Variation?
To further test the robustness of my results, I explore possible temporal variation in the determinants of civilian nuclear cooperation agreements. These results are depicted in Table IV . I limit the analysis to: the complete Cold War period (column 1); the period prior to the creation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime (column 2); the Cold War period following the establishment of the nonproliferation regime (column 3); the entire period following the creation of the nonproliferation regime (column 4); and the post-Cold War period (column 5). 30 Many of the results are consistent across model specifications, but there are some noteworthy differences.
(Insert Table IV about here)
The results reveal that nuclear supplier states behaved slightly less strategically in the pre- NPT (1950 NPT ( -1969 and post-Cold War periods (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . In the pre-NPT period, I do not find support for my hypotheses regarding superpower enemies and democracy. This is not particularly surprising given that the proliferation consequences of civilian nuclear trade were less understood prior to the formation of the NPT, and especially before the 1974 Indian nuclear test (e.g. Potter 1990 ). In the post-Cold War period, the results fail to lend support to my shared enemy and alliance hypotheses. This may be due to system polarity. Gowa (1994) finds that states are more likely to tie trade to the flag when the international system is bipolar because alliances are more stable. 31 With the collapse of the international system's bipolar structure, states' nuclear trade policies are less influenced by international security, perhaps because there is less of a strategic need to link trade and security in a multi-polar world (Skålnes, 2000) .
In spite of the differences, I find empirical support for the majority of my hypotheses in both of these time periods. This is noteworthy since we might expect that supplier states' security interests would not dominate civilian nuclear cooperation in the pre-NPT and post-Cold War eras. The saliency of security interests even in these periods lends further support to my argument. Particularly striking is the finding that states use civilian nuclear cooperation as a means to constrain superpowers even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, suggesting that such behavior is not an artifact of the Cold War.
CONCLUSION
A number of important conclusions flow from this analysis. In a general sense, my findings shed light on the factors motivating states to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation. This is something that was scantily understood prior to this study. The results support my argument that the strategic interests of nuclear suppliers are salient in explaining civilian nuclear commerce. Particularly novel is my finding that supplier states use civilian nuclear cooperation agreements as a means to constrain the power of those that they are threatened by. This lends support to the realist argument that states befriend those they share enemies with in order to constrain the power of their adversaries (e.g. Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1994/95) . This is an ominous conclusion from the perspective of American foreign policy. It suggests that supplier states' incentives to provide nuclear technology to U.S. enemies-such as Iran and Syria-will ultimately trump Washington's efforts to stop these activities. Finally, this result lends further support to the argument that indirect/triadic relationships are important in international politics and worthy of additional research (Maoz et al 2006 (Maoz et al , 2007 Crescenzi 2007 ).
My analysis reveals that supplier state's strategic considerations trump nonproliferation-related factors when it comes to civilian nuclear cooperation. States that are pursuing nuclear weapons are actually more likely to receive civilian nuclear assistance. I find no support for the argument that NPT membership increases the likelihood that states will receive nuclear technology. This raises cause for concern from a policy standpoint because it suggests that the nuclear weapons states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are not living up to their commitment to supply nuclear technology for "peaceful purposes" to states that sign the NPT. This finding also speaks to a general debate in international relations regarding whether treaties and other institutional commitments matter (e.g. Chayes and Chayes 1993; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996) . Although NPT membership may reduce the likelihood that states pursue nuclear weapons (Jo and Gartzke 2007) my results suggest that it does not make states more likely to receive nuclear technology for peaceful use.
This casts some doubt on the argument that international commitments change state behavior and/or that states maintain the commitments they make, although we should be cautious about reading too much into this finding.
As I highlighted in the introduction, the United States has been widely criticized for signing a nuclear cooperation agreement with India because New Delhi possess nuclear weapons and refuses to sign the NPT. Many scholars have asserted that U.S. All probabilities are generated using the estimates in the fourth column of Table II. All variables are set to their mean. For dichotomous variables, the "low" value is 0 and the "high" value is 1. For continuous variables, the "low" value is ½ standard deviation below the mean and the "high" value is ½ standard deviation above the mean. Predicted annual number of agreements are calculated by multiplying the predicted probability of a dyad forming a NCA by the total number of observations in the sample (140.884) and then dividing that number by the number of years in the sample (51). : * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results for years passing without signing of nuclear cooperation agreement and 3 cubic splines are not reported in the interest of space. 1 The terms "nuclear cooperation" and "nuclear trade" are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
NOTES
2 For more on the U.S.-India nuclear pact see Perkovitch (2005) .
3 Swedish Nobel Prize-winning physicist Hannes Alven once described the peaceful and military uses of the atom as "Siamese twins." 4 My analysis captures only state-sanctioned nuclear cooperation. Illegal nuclear activities not approved by the state are excluded, although these occurrences are fairly rare since states keep a close eye on nuclear-related activities. Even the AQ Khan network, which is often referred to as an illicit network, had at least tacit approval from the Pakistani government. My analysis does include covert activities if they are state sanctioned. For example, the Soviet Union covertly exported nuclear technology to China in the 1950s but these transactions are part of my analysis since Moscow signed agreements authorizing them. 5 Much of the extant literature focuses on why states pursue nuclear weapons, rather than how they acquire them (e.g. Quester 1973; Solingen 1994; Sagan 1996/97; Singh and Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007) . 6 The argument I advance is state-centric because trade in nuclear technology is highly regulated. Supplier states must formally approve nuclear transactions in almost all cases by signing bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with importing states. So firms cannot engage in legal nuclear trade without explicit approval of the state. 7 It is well known, for example, that nuclear weapons have tremendous destructive power and can be an effective deterrent (Quester, 1973) as well as that the spread of nuclear weapons can produce instability (Waltz and Sagan, 1995) . 8 Article IV of the NPT states that treaty members are entitled to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
NPT membership decreases the likelihood that states will have nuclear weapons programs but this does not necessarily imply that change in behavior is attributable to treaty membership (Jo and Gartzke 2007: 13) .
weapons, the transfer of significant quantities of weapons-grade fissile material, or assistance in the construction of uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing plants.
